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POSNER ON TEACHING EVIDENCE
By Roger C. Park*
Judge Posner's essay describes how he teaches an evidence and
advocacy course with trial simulations using the National Institute of
Trial Advocacy ("NITA") materials. This comment states reservations
about imitating his method, and argues that the case method is a good
way of teaching the basic evidence course.
I. LEGAL REALISM AND THE SIMULATION METHOD
Judge Posner says that his approach,
[R]eflects a more general view of law that I hold and that is at odds with the
view held, I believe largely for career reasons, by most law professors. I am an
unrepentant legal pragmatist or if you will, legal realist who believes that
doctrine is overemphasized as a determinant of case outcomes.
2
Judge Posner is probably right about law professors. Although
many law professors are realists or hyperrealists in theory, in classroom
teaching we are prone to give a lot of attention to doctrine. However,
teaching evidence by simulation would not cure the problem, and might
aggravate it.
Many realists have found the case method to be a congenial tool
for encouraging a skeptical approach to the study of law and
demonstrating the fallacies of formalism. Duxbury even states that
"[l]egal realism itself seems largely to have been responsible for the
longevity of the case method.",3 The case method keeps us honest, at
* James Edgar Hervey Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings. I
benefitted from the comments of Fred Moss and Roger Kirst, and owe special thanks to
Eileen Scallen. I may be prejudiced in favor of the case method because I am co-author
of a casebook, JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
(9'h ed. 1999).
2. Richard A. Posner, Clinical and Theoretical Approaches to the Teaching of
Evidence and Trial Advocacy, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 731, 734-35 (2003).
3. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 142 (1995) (citing
articles by realists about the case method).
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least when the cases are chosen in a way that gives an accurate
reflection of legal uncertainty. Students pick up lessons of realism in
seeing how important situation-sense is to judges in interpreting
precedent. I remember my own first year of law school, which was
taught exclusively by the case method, as a constant lesson in how
abstract statements of legal rules are less useful than we had expected
them to be.4 In fact, one of the reasons why some students find the case
method frustrating is that it forces them to face uncertainties of the law
in a way that prepackaged texts and annotated codes do not. The case
method teacher may find herself responding to students who are
disturbed by uncertainty by saying, "the law is not just a mechanical
application of rules, judges are reacting to the situation before them" or
"I can't make things simpler than they are."
When cases are discarded in favor of fact scenarios and bare
statutory materials, students will ask the teacher to become the oracle of
evidence law. The ordinary professor would be tempted by the siren
song of certainty. Students constantly hope that the professor will stop
hiding the ball and state the black-letter principles more clearly. This
tempts us to make the law simpler than it is, to state doctrine that solves
problems instead of creating them. Good casebooks act as a
counterweight, presenting cases with all their doctrinal warts. The case
method puts the propensity of law professors to puncture the pretenses
of others to work in the cause of realism.
Judge Posner gives a conventional law school exam at the end of
his course.5 He assigns as reading the NITA files of mock cases, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and "some very limited secondary
material.",6 If I imitated his approach, I would wonder what else my
students were reading. Almost no one learns a code from raw materials,
and students frequently prepare for exams by reading outlines and texts
recommended by their peers. The popular exam-cramming books tend
4. For example, my Civil Procedure professor, Paul Bator, used what was then
the Field & Kaplan casebook, starting with the Schlagenhauf case and proceeding
through a series of cases on the concept of transaction and occurrence, whose apparent
point was to rid us of exaggerated ideas of the role of abstract legal concepts in
determining outcomes.
Evidence casebooks reinforce this lesson even when that is not their main
purpose. For example, students realize that the definition of hearsay has fuzzy edges
when they reach cases dealing with use of out-of-court statements as circumstantial
evidence-for example, United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980) and
United States v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 950 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1991).
5. Posner, supra note 2, at 733.
6. Id. at 732.
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to be black-letter guides that cater to the desire for heavy doses of fixed,
certain rules. (I suggest that evidence teachers, whatever their teaching
method, make a visit to their law school bookstore to see what their
students are buying.) In a case method course, one can at least hope that
the students will also read the assigned cases and grapple with the
problems raised by them.
It may be that I am overemphasizing the question whether
simulation instruction inculcates legal realism, and that Judge Posner's
main interest is to avoid personally teaching doctrine. Whatever the
rationale, the fact that the method works for him doesn't mean it will
work for others. Law professors who overemphasize the effect of
predetermined rules in making evidence decisions will do so when they
teach by the simulation method just as much, or more, than they do
when teaching by the case method. Students who are given
conventional law school exams will study doctrine, if not in the case
law, then in texts and commercial outlines that purport to make the
doctrine simpler, more consistent, and easier to understand than the raw
material presented by the case law.
1I. ECONOMICS AS THE UNIFYING FRAMEWORK
Judge Posner plans to add a theory segment to his simulation
teaching, and favors an economic approach as providing "a unifying
framework in which to draw together the various strands of theoretical
(and empirical) reflection on the law of evidence." 7 To add economic
theory to the atheoretical simulation experience, he needs to have more
time than his current thirty-six hour allotment, though he would not
need seventy-two hours.8
I can understand the appeal of economic analysis. No other
respectable body of knowledge purports to explain so much and yet
could be taught in so little time. But my brand of legal pragmatism is
more humble, or perhaps more disjointed. I don't think that the
evidence course needs a synthesizer any more elaborate than Rule 403
itself, along with the guidelines for using it set forth in dictum in the Old
Chief case.9 Like Judge Posner, the professor will constantly go back to
7. Id. at 736.
8. Judge Posner teaches two two-hour classes a week for nine weeks. Id. at 733.
He estimates he would need more time than this to add an economics overlay, but not
twice as much time. Posner, supra note 2, at 736.
9. Old Chiefv. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
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ideas of prejudice, cost, and alternatives, but the apparatus presented in
Judge Posner's evidence article is not needed for that.'
0
I don't mean to say that the evidence course should be wholly
doctrinal. Admittedly, I do think students benefit from some of the
standard features of doctrinal analysis, such as interpreting rules in light
of rationale and interpreting statutory provisions in light of each other.
And I have nothing against fireside policy analysis; all lawyers need
practice in that. But the evidence teacher should certainly aim at
incorporating a degree of systematic learning from non-law fields.
Some possibilities are: character evidence (personality theory), rules
412-415 (feminist theory, criminology), impeachment with prior
convictions (informal Bayesianism, psychology), the values behind the
Confrontation Clause (history, fireside policy analysis), Daubert issues
(scientific method, statistics), and forensic evidence in general (various
lessons about probability, e.g., assessing error rates, testimony in
Bayesian and frequentist forms, "prosecutor's fallacy," "defense
counsel's fallacy," "source probability error," using base rates in
arriving at predictive value). Cases will sometimes also raise overtly
nondoctrinal issues, such as the utility of expert testimony by
psychologists about eyewitness identification. I think it is better to go
straight to these bodies of knowledge without a more formal economic
overlay.
Judge Posner says that Rule 403 has the centrality of Learned
10. For a more elaborate critique, see Roger C. Park, Grand Perspectives on
Evidence Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 2055 (2001). See also Richard Lempert, The Economic
Analysis of Evidence Law: Common Sense on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REV. 1619 (2001), with
which I largely agree.
Judge Posner graciously praises part of my oral presentation at the AALS
conference, but takes exception to the way I described his article on an economic
approach to evidence law. He writes:
Professor Park suggested yesterday that my article on evidence focuses unduly
on the effect of evidence law on behavior outside the courtroom. That is not
correct. I touch on that effect, but my focus is on the effect of the law on the trial
process itself; hence the centrality of Rule 403 to my analysis.
Posner, supra note 2, at 737. Judge Posner has a valid point. For my oral presentation at
the conference, I had originally planned to comment on things I liked about his evidence
article (e.g., most of its discussion of Blue Bus issues) and things I didn't like (e.g.,
certain flights of fancy about ex ante effects), but I was pressed for time and ended up
merely noting the importance of the article, and criticizing some of its speculation about
extrinsic effects. This approach may have misled some listeners about the scope of his
evidence article. For a fuller statement of my views, see Park, supra. Readers who are
online may want to click on my one-page description of his article, written for the
AALS Newsletter in 1999, at http://www.law.umich.edu/thayer/parkposn.htm.
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Hand's tort law formula. I think he is right, but that he has yet to come
up with a formula that is a good substitute for the words of Rule 403.
His equation modeling the benefit of evidence would be a headache to
teach." Here is the equation, from Judge Posner's article An Economic
Approach to the Law of Evidence: B(x) = p(bIx - b2x2)S - c(x).
The equation tells us that the net benefit of evidence, B(x), is equal
to the net probability that evidence will help or hurt the search for truth,
p(blx - b2x2), times the stakes in the case, S, minus the cost of the
evidence, c(x). The help/hurt probability is derived by subtracting
harmfulness (b2x) from helpfulness (bix). The hurtfulness effect is
squared on grounds that "the latter effect [confusing or overloading the
jury] will increase at an increasing rate with increases in the amount of
evidence ....,,12
In class, it would take a bit of time just to lay out this formula. If I
were to do that, I would be at a loss to answer certain questions about it.
Does the hurtful effect of prejudicial evidence really continue to
increase at a geometric rate instead of leveling off and becoming
cumulative? Is the equation pure metaphor or can actual numbers be
inserted? If numbers can be used, why does half a unit of prejudice
become a quarter unit, while ten units become a hundred units? (.52 
.25, while 102 = 100).
I'd rather just tell students that harm (prejudice, confusion, waste
of time) needs to be weighed against probative value, while taking into
account alternative ways of proving the proposition. This words-only
guideline is not as obvious as it seems, and it applies whether one is
considering the admissibility of an emotional videotape or the
admissibility of an out-of-court statement purportedly offered to throw
light on subsequent conduct.
III. PRACTICAL TEACHING ISSUES
To some extent, the lively and talented performances that Judge
Posner has observed in his simulation class may be due to the Posner
Factor, a combination of student self-selection and observer effect. If I
were a student at the University of Chicago Law School, I would
11. Judge Posner does not say that he plans to use this equation in class, but
equations do play a significant role in his evidence article, so I assume he would at least
consider using this way of elaborating on Rule 403.
12. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN.
L. REv. 1477, 1524 (1999).
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hesitate to take Judge Posner's thirty-student course unless I were
prepared to work hard and was confident of my abilities. And if I got
into his course, I would do my best to shine, even if it meant studying a
little less in my other courses.
I do, however, think that other teachers would see an increase in
liveliness ana effort if they adopted his approach. The NITA materials
are well done. Students using them easily see the relevance of what
they are doing to their professional aspirations, and view their class
performance as a predictor of how well they will do in practice. In
contrast, in the large Socratic method class, the chance of being called
upon to perform on any particular day is relatively small, the role of
preparation in ensuring good performance uncertain, and the connection
between good performance in class roles and in lawyer roles debatable.
I've also used NITA materials to teach Trial Advocacy and
Evidence,' 3 and I can confirm Judge Posner's observation that classes
were livelier. Admittedly, my classes were not quite as electric as Judge
Posner's. None of my students ever cried on the stand, while it is not
unusual for his students to do so when playing the role of a plaintiff or a
member of a plaintiffs family.14 So my guess is that the Posner Factor
adds something. But my students also turned in good performances.
Despite the advantage of livelier classes, I don't think that the trial
simulation method should become the standard way of teaching the
basic evidence course. In fact, after teaching the basic evidence course
several different ways (with trial simulations, with the case method,
with different versions of the problem method, and even with a
computer-aided self-instruction frequent-exam method), I've become
quite happy using a version of the case method for my basic evidence
course.
One reason is that the case method works for large classes. Judge
Posner limits his class to thirty students, and for good reason. With a
larger class, it would be harder for every student to do a substantial
performance. Worse, the students who were not performing would be
detached from the enterprise while others were doing the motion in
limine assignments that Judge Posner uses. If students are bored by
short hypotheticals, surely they will be even more bored by hearing
other students argue motions for which the participants have prepared
13. I taught trial advocacy at the University of Minnesota for several years using NITA
materials. I also taught a combined evidence-trial advocacy course using the materials and
McCormick on Evidence.
14. Posner, supra note 2, at 732-33.
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extensively, but the listeners have prepared minimally or not at all. In
contrast, in a large class taught by the dialogue method, students have a
realistic opportunity to participate in almost every class and an equal
chance to participate vicariously.
In the school at which I teach, almost every student takes the
evidence course, even though it is not a required course. Typically, my
evidence class has about 100 students. If I am right in thinking that the
trial simulation method would not work well in that large a class, then
an economic approach to teaching method would call for comparing the
benefit of reducing class size in the evidence course to the benefit of
reducing it in other courses. In the litigation area alone, there are other
courses that have a stronger claim to small-class status than the basic
evidence course. The trial simulation method simulates what is
becoming an increasingly rare activity for lawyers (participating in full-
blown trials).15 This form of simulation should not be given a higher
claim to small-class resources than courses that involve more common
lawyer activities (e.g., pretrial practice, negotiation, mediation),
especially where the course cannot feasibly be taught in a large class
(e.g., clinical courses with real clients).
A variety of the trial simulation approach could be used in a large
class. Witness testimony could be simulated, and students could call out
objections. I do that two or three times in my own large-class evidence
course, and it makes a nice change. It is not, however, a cure-all. The
reason is that stand-up-and object exercises, particularly if they are
performed naturalistically by having students frame questions, lead to
spending too much time on trivial objections to form. Since these
objections rarely result in exclusion of evidence (because questions can
be rephrased) or reversal on appeal (because error is harmless), they are
of limited practical importance and barren of theoretical interest. For
more complicated problems, such as the exclusion of hearsay, constant
use of trial simulation exercises is awkward and time-consuming. For
example, when hearsay evidence is offered, the judge normally needs to
know the contents of the out-of-court statement in order to rule, but the
jury should not know its contents until the judge has determined that it
is admissible. Going through the process of objection, sidebar, offer of
15. See Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J. 24, 24, October
2002. The proportion of federal civil cases resolved after either bench or jury trial
dropped from 10% in 1970 to 2.2% in 2001, and that there is a similar trend in the state
courts. Id. In federal criminal cases, 85% of defendants in 2001 pled guilty and waived
trial, compared to a low of 62% in the 1970s. Id.
2003]
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proof, ruling, and re-asking the question is cumbersome. Nor is it
obvious what students get out of reiterations of "Did you then have a
conversation with X," and "What did X say?" Finally, trying to put
everything into the simulated-case format can be awkward, because the
fictional cases have to be twisted if they are going to raise a spectrum of
hearsay points. It is better to ask fifteen hearsay hypotheticals than use
a transcript that attempts to cram fifteen hearsay problems into one
"case."
Of course, a milder form of simulation can be built into any
Socratic method class, simply by framing a hypothetical as a trial
problem and asking the student whether they would object to the
evidence (or sustain an objection if they were the judge). Some of the
flavor of a real trial is lost, but less time is wasted on reiterations of trial
formalities. Also, an in-depth discussion of interpretive issues is
possible, without having to jump in and out of a fictional trial.
For many evidence issues, it is awkward to use a trial objection
format, and presenting the issues this way does not mimic reality.
Consider issues involving prior convictions, privileges, and screening
under Daubert. Important issues of this nature are usually handled
before trial or in separate hearings during trial. The solution, of course,
is to simulate motions in limine, as Judge Posner does, but in a large
class this would raise the boredom problem he tries to avoid, as students
do not feel very involved when they watch another student doing an
extended argument.
Finally, not all evidence law problems arise in the courtroom.
Lawyers also plan how to argue for and against the admissibility of
evidence. Ordinary class discussion simulates this activity, sometimes
fairly realistically.
The trial simulation method, like the problem method to which
Judge Posner gives a more tepid endorsement, carries a bit of excess
baggage, which is that students have to keep track of the hypothesized
facts, sometimes-complicated constellations of them, in order to
perform effectively. In using the case method, I often strive for
hypotheticals whose facts are short and simple, so that students can
grasp them easily and focus on issues of policy and interpretation.
If an instructor using the trial simulation method tries to fit all of
the evidence issues into one or two mock cases, realism is lost in
another way. The facts of the fictional cases have to be constructed so
that they will raise disparate evidence issues, and this can make those
cases less realistic. By contrast, the case method affords the luxury of
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being able to move from a corporate tax case to a drug conspiracy to a
medical malpractice action in the same class hour, putting the evidence
issues in factual contexts in which they more often arise naturalistically.
It would be hypocritical of me to get carried away in criticizing
Judge Posner's method, because I teach a course, listed in the catalogue
as Trial Objections, in which students also perform courtroom roles and
argue motions in limine. It is a practical evidence course designed as a
bridge between the large-class basic evidence course and the trial
advocacy. Enrollment is limited to sixteen students who have already
taken the basic evidence course. Students start by doing on-your-feet
objections, progress to short exercises in which they argue about the
admissibility of exhibits, and then argue a major motion in limine,
usually one that involves expert or scientific evidence. I use class
materials specifically designed for the course. Students are graded on
written and oral performance; there is no final exam. There is nothing I
can point to about my course that shows it to be better than the one
Judge Posner now teaches. I like teaching the course and it finds a
market among students who intend to specialize in trial work. But I
don't think it would be a feasible substitute for the basic evidence
course.
The basic evidence course will probably continue to be taught in
large classes, using casebooks and problem books, with only occasional
trial simulations. Judge Posner's second choice, after the simulation
method he now uses, would apparently be the problem method. 16
I'm not sure I know exactly what the difference between the "case
method" and the "problem method" is. But let me briefly comment on
two possible differences: (1) case method teachers require the students
to read actual cases and then ask questions about those cases in class,
whereas problem method teachers, to a greater degree, require students
to read text and fictional fact scenarios, and ask questions about the fact
scenarios, and/or (2) case method teachers use oral questions and
hypotheticals that are not revealed to the students ahead of time,
whereas problem method teachers more often use pre-set problems.
16. "[L]et me acknowledge that a modem problem-oriented evidence course with
dollops of theoretical materials may do the trick as well as the kind of expanded clinical
course that I envisage. But I have my doubts, because problems don't give the student a
sense of a trial as a distinctive, organic whole." Posner, supra note 2, at 736.
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A. On Assigning and Using Case Opinions
In comparing the methods, I'll start by noting that cases are
problems. Not only are they problems with a full factual context, but
also they are problems based on events that actually occurred (or at least
were determined to have occurred). The fact-not-fiction aspect of case
law gives students more incentive to pay attention to the facts and
makes the facts more memorable. Furthermore, the facts in a casebook
serve double duty. Like the facts in a problem book, they provide a
background context that gives a realistic flavor to evidence issues. But
they are also legal precedent. When students learn the facts of the
Upjohn case and its result, they are learning the precedent established
by the Upjohn case. Doctrine isn't everything, but it is something. The
cases students study can become a part of their common vocabulary,
something they come back to later in their careers. Finally, cases are
raw materials, and there is some advantage in training students to use
raw materials rather than pre-digested text.
The professor who uses a casebook doesn't have to use a
Kingsfield-like case method. I rarely ask my students to state the
holding of a case or to distinguish two cases. Sometimes I state the facts
myself and ask students to argue for admission or exclusion of the
evidence. Sometimes I note that the case was not decided under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and ask how a case with the same facts
should be decided in a Federal Rules jurisdiction. Often, I pose
hypotheticals that are variations on the case facts. I really fail to see how
this is very different from the problem method, except that the basic
core of facts comes from a case report.
B. On Using Oral Hypotheticals
First, it is doubtful that anyone uses either all oral questions or all
pre-set problems. Casebooks, like problem books, include questions for
students to study before class, and problem method teachers ask
questions not included in the materials assigned, just as case method
teachers do. But I will assume, for the purpose of creating some
difference between the two methods, that problem method teachers are
more prone to using pre-set questions than are case method teachers,
with the latter being more prone to using oral hypotheticals.
Each has its advantages. Pre-set problems allow time for thought
and use of a richer factual context. Oral class hypotheticals are fresher.
Problems can get stale, both for students and professors. Canned
QLR
2003] POSNER ON TEACHING EVIDENCE 751
answers may even appear in the electronic outlines passed from class to
class, just as canned case briefs appear in commercial outlines. The
element of surprise inherent in oral hypotheticals calls for trial-like skill
in applying knowledge to new situations on the fly, though it can also
slow down class discussion and cause anxiety.
I believe that the learning experience of students depends mainly
on their own motivations and abilities, and secondarily on the talent and
dedication of the teacher. Course materials help when they are done
well. If the course materials fit the teacher's style and are prepared with
skill and care, it matters little whether they are "case method" or
"problem method" materials.

